redundant, is put forward by John Divers (1999) . On Divers's redundancy interpretation 'Necessarily there is only one world' is assigned the analysis 'There is only one world' and hence comes out as false by modal realist lights, whilst 'Possibly there many worlds' and 'Necessarily there are many worlds' are both equivalent to 'There are many worlds' and true.
I argue that even when the rules of the translation scheme are modified as Divers proposes modal realist analysis of statements of modal discourse will still be strictly inadequate (though materially adequate) in the eyes of the modal realist.
Strict adequacy of a modal realist analysis of modal discourse can be achieved, however, on an approach that extends the redundancy interpretation to all de dicto modal statements. The price the modal realist must pay for this is the denial of de dicto contingency. But maybe this is a price worth paying, or no great price at all.
Even if this is not so, I will not argue that this is a problem for modal realism. Perhaps something less than strict adequacy is enough. Perhaps, if the modal realist has a systematic means of replacing every sentence of quantified modal logic which he considers true by a sentence of counterpart theory that he considers true, he need do no more.
2 Still, traditionally philosophical analysis aims at strict adequacy so that it is as well to know that this is a test the modal realist analysis of modal discourse fails unless de dicto contingency is abandoned.
The problem for the modal realist and Divers's solution
The point that according to Lewis's original 1968 translation scheme the modal realist analysis is not strictly adequate is easy to see.
2 But, as an anonymous referee has impressed upon me: 'Everything here depends on what is meant by "systematic". Let T and F be a tautology and a contradiction respectively in the language of counterpart theory. What if the modal realist announces that every true sentence of quantified modal logic is to be mapped onto T and very false sentence to F? That is systematic in a way, and all the resulting material biconditionals are true. If the language of modal logic is sufficiently restricted it may even admit of a decision procedure, in which case the mapping can be made recursive.' So the occurrences of 'perhaps' in the text should not be ignored. The modal realist who retains de dicto contingency cannot require strict adequacy in his paraphrases, but he presumably must intend more than mere material adequacy. As should be evident I think that developing an account that denies de dicto contingency is a more promising route for the modal realist. true left-to-right since 'in' denotes an extensional relation). In short, 'there is a world in which there is a talking donkey' is strictly equivalent to 'there is a talking donkey'. But according to Lewis's 1968 translation scheme 'it is necessarily true that there is a talking donkey' is false. Hence, since 'there is a talking donkey' is strictly equivalent to 'there is a possible world in which there is a talking donkey', once again the latter is not strictly equivalent to 'it is possible that there is a talking donkey' since 'it is necessarily true that it is possible that there is a talking donkey' is true by Lewis's 1968 translation scheme.
According to Divers (1999) Lewis's 1968 translation scheme should be modified as follows.
We need to distinguish between two cases: ordinary and extraordinary or 'advanced' modalizing. In the ordinary cases Lewis's translation scheme should be used; in advanced cases a redundancy interpretation should be given. Ordinary modalizing is modalizing about ordinary individuals, individuals which are parts of a world (Divers 1999, p. 218) , that is, have all their parts spatiotemporally related to one another. Advanced modalized is modalizing about transworld individuals (Divers 1999, p. 220) . Again (and somewhat more generally) advanced modalizing takes place 'when and only when the quantification in the contained non-modal sentence is not world-restricted' (Divers 1999, p. 230 Granted that the quantification within 'necessarily there are talking donkeys' does not, in the relevant sense, introduce modalizing about transworld individuals or worlds, and hence that the redundancy interpretation cannot be appealed to, the modal realist can nonetheless still argue for the strict adequacy of a modal realist analysis by maintaining that the redundancy interpretation applies to 'necessarily there is a possible world in which there is a talking donkey'. Given the last quotation from Divers it is not clear how this can be justified. But suppose it can. Then the price the modal realist pays is that he cannot regard 'there is a possible world in which there is a talking donkey' and 'there is a talking donkey' as strictly equivalent despite the fact that given the meaning of 'possible world' and 'donkey' the biconditional joining them is analytically true.
An alternative solution
There is another way the modal realist can appeal to the redundancy interpretation, however.
Since he is already in massive disagreement with common-sense about the existence of talking donkeys, it is not a great step for him to deny the contingency of their existence. But if he does this he can give what is by his lights a strictly adequate counterpart-theoretic analysis of ordinary modal discourse by giving a redundancy interpretation of all de dicto modal statements. So he can say that the analysis of the de dicto 'possibly there is a talking donkey' is 'there is a talking donkey', as is the analysis of the de dicto 'it is necessarily true that possibly there is a talking donkey'. Since he denies de dicto contingency and accepts that it is necessarily true that there is a talking donkey he can then say that the analysandum 'possibly there is a talking donkey' and the analysans 'there is a talking donkey' are not only alike in truth-value, but necessarily alike in truth-value, so the analysis is strictly as well as materially adequate.
On this account what triggers a redundancy interpretation of a modal statement is not that it is a case of advanced modalizing but that it is a de dicto modal statement. When this is not so
Lewis's 1968 rules apply. So 'possibly/necessarily there is a talking donkey' is just analysed as 'there is a talking donkey', but 'there is something which is possibly a talking donkey' is analysed as 'there is something in the actual world which has a counterpart in some world which is a talking donkey'. 3 Now if the modal realist thinks that there is a talking donkey he must also think, by the same token, that there is something which is possibly a talking donkey. So he must accept that, by the same token, its analysis, 'there is something in the actual world which has a counterpart in some world which is a talking donkey', is true. So he must accept that everything is actual, that is, that 'is actual' is coextensive with 'exists'. This is inconsistent with Lewis's account of 'actually' as an indexical. But the Lewisean account is provided merely to ensure that the commonsense man says something true when he says 3 Modal operators in de re modal statements must not be interpreted as restricting quantifiers within their scope.
The de re 'something is possibly a talking donkey' is to be analysed as 'there is something in the actual world and a possible world and a counterpart of it therein such that the counterpart is a talking donkey'. The de re 'something is possibly uglier than some ogre' is to be analysed as 'there is something in the actual world and a possible world and a counterpart of it therein such that that counterpart is uglier than something which is an ogre', not as '… than something which is part of that world and is an ogre'. Lewis allows (1986, p. 6 ) that modal operators need not restrict quantifiers within their scope.
'there are no talking donkeys' -that there are no talking donkeys around here -though what he believes is something false by modal realist lights, that is, that there are no talking donkeys at all. This is unnecessary charity. It is like interpreting the man who really does think that there is no beer anywhere (and so none in the fridge) as meaning merely 'there is no beer in the fridge' when he says that there is no beer. The modal realist does not need to extend this charity and cannot do so whilst maintaining both that 'there are talking donkeys' is true and that the analysis of 'there are things that are possibly talking donkeys' is 'there something in the actual world which has a counterpart in some world which is a talking donkey'. But whenever charity is appropriate the de dicto contingency denying modal realist can extend it as easily as any other modal realist. The commonsense man will say both that there are not, but might have been, talking donkeys, and that there are, but might not have been, snakes (and that even if there had been talking donkeys there might not have been). Any modal realist should say that the first claim, as the commonsense man intends it, is necessarily false (since the commonsense man does not intend any quantifier restriction). 4 But the de dicto contingency denying modal realist can interpret the commonsense man's second claim as expressing a truth as easily as any other modal realist. According to him our world might have been free of snakes (it has a counterpart -Ireland or a duplicate -which is), or equivalently expressed without reference to a world, of any spatiotemporal region we inhabit it is true that it might have been free of snakes. So he can charitably interpret the commonsense man's claim that there might have been no snakes as expressing a de re truth rather than a de dicto falsehood. He need not slavishly follow the division of vernacular modal statements into de re and de dicto which translation into the language of boxes and diamonds imposes. His disagreement with commonsense therefore need be no more extreme than that of any other modal realist. The sum of the last second stage of that counterpart and me is surely as similar to me as a poached egg is under some similarity relation employable as a counterpart relation.) So if counterpart theory is right I have a transworld individual as a counterpart. Similarly a pair of unrelated individuals has a counterpart pair -itself, at least -which is a pair of unrelated individuals. 5 If the redundancy interpretation of de dicto modal statements is accepted, then, the interpretation of de re modal statements should also be modified to dispense with quantification over, and restriction to the parts of, worlds. Thus 'there is something which is possibly a talking donkey' should be analysed as 'something has a talking donkey as a counterpart'. Possible worlds then drop out of the modal realist account of modal discourse both in the case of statements of de dicto and in the case of statements of de re modality (whether they are required elsewhere is another matter) . A scheme for translating statements in the language of boxes and diamonds into counterpart theory discourse that conforms to this perspective is as follows. Given a statement in the language of quantified modal logic (a) drop all modal operators not within the scope of quantifiers, then (b) beginning with innermost occurrences, replace ◊φα 1 … α n 1 … α n, in which α 1 … α n are free, with, respectively, γ 1 … γ n (Cγ 1 α 1  …  Cγ n α n & φγ 1 … γ n) and γ 1 … γ n (Cγ 1 α 1  …  Cγ n α n  φγ 1 … γ n) in which γ 1 , … , γ n are new.
Conclusion
I have argued that if he denies de dicto contingency and gives a redundancy interpretation of all de dicto modal statements the modal realist can maintain that his analysis of modal discourse is strictly adequate. The alternative is for the modal realist to accept, with Lewis in 1968 , that his analysis is materially adequate but not strictly adequate. 'Possibly there is a talking donkey' and 'there is a world in which there is a talking donkey' are alike in truthvalue, but 'it is necessarily true that it is possible that there is a talking donkey' and 'it is necessarily true that there is a world in which there is a talking donkey' differ in truth-value.
The former is true and the latter false. So, just as it is contingent whether there is a talking donkey, it is contingent whether there is a world in which there is a talking donkey (since it is possibly true that there is a world in which there is a talking donkey).
The merely contingent existence of a world in which there is a talking donkey may seem hard to swallow. But we have no choice if we accept (a) that it is necessarily true that if there is a world in which there is a talking donkey there is a talking donkey, (b) that if so and it is necessarily true that there is a world in which there is a talking donkey it is a necessary truth that there is a talking donkey and (c) that it is not a necessary truth that there is a talking donkey.
In sum, since any truth is necessary or contingent any modal realist is obliged to say, of any biconditional linking a modal claim with its purported content-giving equivalent in the language of counterpart theory, which of these it is. Lewis's 1968 translation scheme
